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Defendants-Respondents file this Petition for Rehearing 
pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. Counsel 
for Defendants-Respondents hereby certify that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
BACKGROUND 
This is a legal malpractice case. Plaintiff Garth Youd 
(MYoudM or "Garth") retained Defendants to pursue an action 
against Zions First National Bank ("Zions") to recover amounts 
Youd claimed due him under two Certificates of Deposit, one for 
$10,000 and one for $15,000 ("the CD's"). The money for the CD's 
had been deposited by Youd's father, Wilford, and the CD's were 
payable to "Wilford Youd or Garth Youd." Judgment was entered in 
favor of Zions. Youd then instituted this action against 
Defendants. Defendants admitted negligence, limiting the issues 
to causation and damages — whether Defendants' negligence harmed 
the plaintiff. Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming 
Zions was statutorily protected by Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-112 from 
liability on claims such as Youd's for improper payment on 
multiple-party certificates of deposit, and accordingly 
Defendants' negligence could not have caused any damage to 
Plaintiff, since he would have lost under any circumstances. The 
court below granted Defendants' motion. 
Plaintiff appealed, claiming that there was a material 
issue of fact as to whether Zions had reissued the $10,000 
certificate of deposit to Garth before receiving Wilford's 
contrary instructions, that Youd was entitled to recover on the 
$10,000 CD pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-116, that Wilford's 
request did not comport with statutory requirements, and that a 
bailment theory entitled Youd to a claim of conversion. 
Defendants responded on appeal, arguing that the UCC did not 
apply# that Wilford's request was proper as a matter of law, that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning the 
reissuance of the $10,000 CD, and that even if a bailment had been 
created, Zions could have incurred no liability to Youd for 
following the instructions of the undisputed owner of the CD's, 
Wilford. In its opinion the Court held that the UCC did not 
apply# and did not address the other issues, holding instead that 
the CD's were ambiguous as to whether or not they created a joint 
account between Garth and Wilford, which it stated was a 
prerequisite to the application of Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-112 and 
reversed for further proceedings. 
REASONS FOR REHEARING 
This Court reversed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendants because it concluded that 
there was an ambiguity in the CD's which could preclude the 
application of the shield from liability provided by Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-6-112, which was the basis for the lower court's 
ruling. The Court should reconsider its opinion because: 
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1. There are no material issues of fact to preclude 
summary judgment. Regardless of the determination of the issue 
raised by the Court of Wilford Youd's intent in depositing the 
funds into the CD's, Defendants are still entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. If he had no intent to give Garth a 
joint interest in the certificates, Garth had no claim to them and 
therefore no cause of action against Zions for not paying him the 
money. If Wilford did intend to make Garth a joint payee, we 
return to the issues argued and briefed on this appeal and Zions 
is still protected by operation of § 75-6-112. At most, the issue 
raised by the Court should be treated as one admitted by the 
Defendants for purposes of their summary judgment motion. A major 
purpose of summary judgment is to avoid an unnecessary trial, 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 
1984). The remand of this case would only result in a useless 
trial concerning the intent of a dead man where either outcome 
compels the same result obtained by the court below in granting 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
2. Even if the CD's are pay on death ("P.O.D.") 
accounts, Zions would have still been entitled to protection from 
§ 75-6-112, and summary judgment in favor of Defendants would 
still be proper. 
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3. The Court's opinion could be read to find ambiguity 
in virtually any document, effectively precluding summary judgment 
in most cases. 
4. The Court's opinion could be read to expose financial 
institutions to an untenable double-bind which the Legislature 
addressed by passing § 75-6-112. 
5. Under no circumstances could Zions have been liable 
for the reissuance of the $15,000 certificate, and at the least 
the summary judgment should have been affirmed as to that 
certificate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT TO PRECLUDE 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS. 
The Court's opinion indicates that a determination of 
Wilford Youd's intent at the time he deposited the funds into the 
CD's must be made to see if § 75-6-112 applies. Essentially the 
question is whether the CD's were jointly payable to Wilford or 
the Plaintiff or if they were payable only to Wilford during his 
life and payable on his death to Plaintiff. However, as the Court 
points out, if it is a P.O.D. account: 
. . . Garth did not have a joint interest in the 
deposit account, (and) Zions would not have been 
liable to Garth as a matter of law because he was 
not a party to the account. 
Opinion at 8. Accordingly, the factual issue the Court discusses 
is not a material issue of fact because if it is determined that 
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Garth had no interest in the CD's, Defendants are entitled to 
summary judgment, just as Zions would have been, and if he did 
have an interest, § 75-6-112 precludes liability. 
It is well-established that summary judgment is 
appropriate: 
. • . where it appears there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material issue of fact, or 
where, even according to the facts as contended 
by the losing party, the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. 
Machan Hampshire Properties v. Western Real Estate & Development 
Co. , 779 P.2d 230, 114 U.A.R. 39, 40 (Utah App. 1989) (citations 
omitted). Here the Plaintiff did not argue the issue raised by 
the Court, but even if it were assumed to be true, Defendants are 
still entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the court below 
should be affirmed. As the Supreme Court of Utah has noted/ 
summary judgment is not precluded "whenever some fact remains in 
dispute, but only when a materia} fact is genuinely controverted." 
Helqar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980). 
The Supreme Court has also stated that M[a] major purpose 
of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial . . . " Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 
1984). Here a remand for a determination of Wilford's intent 
would be a useless gesture, since even if Defendants lost that 
issue and it was determined that Wilford intended to create a 
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joint account, as the parties and the court below assumed, the 
only issues remaining are those which were resolved by the 
granting of Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and which 
were at issue in this appeal. In light of the lack of any 
material issues of fact discussed by the Court concerning the 
application of § 75-6-112 under the facts as they were assumed by 
the parties and the court below (and as they would be if the 
question of intent is resolved adversely to Defendants), remand 
would be a waste of judicial resources, and the order of the court 
below should be affirmed. 
II. EVEN IF THE CD'S ARE P.O.D. ACCOUNTS, SECTION 75-6-112 
SHIELDS ZIONS FROM LIABILITY. 
Defendants respectfully suggest that the Court was 
mistaken in concluding that if the CD's were not joint accounts 
then no discussion of section 75-6-112 could apply. The 
alternative to a joint account ra-ised by the Court is that the 
CD's were P.O.D. accounts, payable to Plaintiff only after 
Wilford's death. It is clear that both joint accounts and P.O.D. 
accounts are defined as "multiple-party accounts" under the terms 
of the probate code. Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-101(5). Section 
75-6-108 provides that H[a]ny multiple-party account may be paid, 
on request of any one or more of the parties." The term "party" 
is defined to refer only to persons with a present right to 
payment, § 75-6-101(7). Section 75-6-112 provides in turn: 
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Payment made pursuant to section 75-6-108 . . . 
discharges the financial institution from all 
claims for amounts so paid whether or not the 
payment is consistent with the beneficial 
ownership of the account as between parties, 
P.O.D. payees, or beneficiaries, or their 
successors. . . . 
Accordingly, regardless of Garth's right to any of the funds in 
the CD's during his father's life, they were multiple-party 
accounts, and Wilford's request that the CD's be reissued 
constituted a request for payment under § 75-6-108• Therefore, 
Zions' action in honoring that request falls within the ambit of 
§ 75-6-112 and Zions is shielded from liability under that 
section, without respect to the other reasons Garth's claim may 
also be rejected. 
III. THE COURT'S DECISION MAY BE READ TO RENDER SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VIRTUALLY USELESS. 
This opinion may be read to support arguments that 
virtually any document is ambiguous so as to preclude summary 
judgment, which could virtually eliminate summary judgment as a 
useful tool to avoid needless trials and pare cases down to the 
truly disputed issues. While the Court correctly draws the 
parties' attention to an ambiguity concerning who is entitled to 
receive interest payments under the CD's, Defendants respectfully 
request the Court to reconsider its decision where there is no 
dispute between the parties as to the effect of the documents and 
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no arguments raised that they are ambiguous. To take that 
ambiguity, coupled with the fact that the forms the CD's are on 
have limited space for entering the address and social security 
number of the payees and conclude that the CD's were ambiguous as 
a matter of law so as to preclude summary judgment threatens the 
efficacy of summary judgment motions in general. This is 
especially true in a case like this where, as discussed above, the 
ambiguity has no legal impact on the outcome of the case. 
It is also a dangerous precedent for the Court to look 
behind the facts agreed to by the parties. Summary judgment 
motions permit the parties to obtain rulings as a matter of law 
based upon a given set of facts. For the court on appeal to 
inquire into whether those facts are really true undermines the 
purpose of summary judgment motions and results in a waste of 
judicial resources at both the trial and appellate levels as well 
as a waste of the parties' time and resources. 
IV. THE COURT'S OPINION MAY BE READ TO PUT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
IN A NO-WIN SITUATION WHERE THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO 
PROVIDE PROTECTION. 
Defendants submit, as discussed above, that § 75-6-112 
provides protection to financial institutions paying on any 
multiple-party account to a person with a present right of payment 
without having to investigate the source of the funds or the 
intention of the parties at the time of investment. However, if 
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the Court is correct that P.O.D. accounts are not subject to the 
shield of § 75-6-112, then financial institutions are placed in an 
untenable situation. 
Using the facts of this case as an example, if Garth had 
requested payment of one of the CD's, Zions would have had no safe 
route under the current opinion. If Zions could have divined that 
the CD might be a P.O.D. account, despite the lack of any language 
to expressly so indicate, it would have to refuse payment pending 
a determination of Wilford's intent or risk paying to someone 
without any present right to the funds, exposing it to liability 
to Wilford. But if Zions later determined that the CD was 
intended to be a joint account, then it broke its contract with 
Garth by not paying when requested, and could be liable to him for 
damages due to the breach. 
Section 75-6-112 attempts to free financial institutions 
from having to investigate the relationship or agreement between 
various payees prior to paying someone who is entitled to receive 
payment. This decision can be read to frustrate that purpose by 
finding potential P.O.D. accounts despite the lack of any language 
concerning payment on death, and holding that payment in such a 
situation would not invoke § 75-6-112, despite its clear language 
concerning application to multiple-party accounts, and its attempt 
to free payors from investigation into the beneficial ownership of 
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the funds. Financial institutions should not be put into such a 
position, especially where, as here, the undisputed beneficial 
owner, Wilford, was paid the funds. 
V. IN ANY EVENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE $15,000 CD SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED. 
Even if the Court were to reject all of the above points, 
there appears to be no reason to refuse to affirm summary judgment 
as to the $15,000 CD. Plaintiff did not even attempt to argue any 
disputed facts concerning this CD. It is clear that it was not 
mature at the time Garth delivered it to Zions. The only 
arguments raised on appeal concerning this CD were that Wilford 
did not make a proper request pursuant to § 75-6-108 or that a 
bailment was created and breached. While the Court's opinion does 
not address either of these issues, as Defendants argued in their 
brief on appeal, neither of Plaintiff's arguments have merit. 
Wilford's request complied with all the conditions of the account, 
according to Zions' policy and procedure, bringing it within the 
definition of -request- set out in § 75-6-101(12). Since Wilford 
was the undisputed "owner- of the CD's, Zions' actions in 
following his wishes rather than Garth's preclude imposition of 
liability on Zions even if a bailment had been formed and 
§ 75-6-112 did not expressly relieve it of liability for payment. 
Since there is no basis for reversal on the $15,000 CD, at the 
least the Court should affirm the summary judgment as to it. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants-Respondents request 
the Court to grant its Petition for Rehearing. 
DATED this 5 day of January, 1990. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Thomas L. K€y 
Steven J Aeschbacher 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
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